Choose any two of the philosophers that we read in Unit 2. Recap each philosopher’s main view about consciousness/the self/personal identity. Explain at least one difference between the two philosophers’ views and state which view you prefer. Then, offer an argument (i.e., evidence) against the view that you reject.
If you need to re-familiarize yourself with the central issues on personal identity, I suggest that you review the following (20-minute) podcast: The Self and Personal Identity. Additional information regarding personal identity can also be found here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
- Start with making a careful summary of two of the philosophers we read in Unit 2. What were their main concepts and definitions, what were their distinctions? How did they imagine that the self was different from the brain or different from the mind? Restate their theory and include "direct quotes", specific references from their work.
- Explain carefully how these views compare and contrast. Be sure to identify and explain at least one difference between the philosophers' views. How do they define a key concept or make a major distinction differently?
- State which view you prefer.
- Offer an argument against the view that you reject.
The self and how it is best defined remains a matter of contention, and it has been a matter of contention for some time. Going back even to the Enlightenment period, with philosophers such as John Locke, David Hume, and others offering differing perspectives on what constituted consciousness, self, and personal identity, and how to go about defining and utilizing such a perspective. The influence of Locke’s original works are apparent in Hume’s later writings. Both Locke and Hume were empiricists who believed that knowledge was gleaned in some manner not through reasoning and innate ideas, as Cartesian rationalism contended, but by the experience of the physical world. Where the two differed was exactly what that implied for the self and personal identity, as well as how exactly such terms were best defined. Interestingly enough, however, Hume maintained Locke’s emphasis on memory as being chiefly significant to defining personal identity.
Locke’s primary argument regarding the self and personal identity is tabula rasa, or the empty mind, blank at the beginning of life and later molded by sensation, experience, and reflection. Before delving into that, he first asserts the dependency of identity as being upon something else other than matter, contending that “For in [living creatures] the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak…” (Locke, 3). If the atomic and material composition of a being does not determine identity, clearly something must determine the continuity of being. Locke comes to the conclusion that memory must be the key component in maintaining the continuity of human identity, and assuming that to be true, all must begin as blank slates that develop over time through empirical experience. Such a position conflicts with “...both the Augustinian view of man as originally sinful and the Cartesian position, which holds that man innately knows basic logical propositions…” (Nimbalkar, 2), providing an empirical perspective on how the self and personal identity are constructed. The assertion that personal identity is determined by the whole of one’s memories and that personal identity is stored in the consciousness, distinct from the body and soul, forms Lockean Memory Theory, “for the brain, as the body and as any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same” (Nimbalkar, 3). Further distinctions made by Locke are that man and person are separate, the man being the material construct and the person being the consciousness, which can be transferred from soul to soul with accompanying personal identity.
Whereas Locke posits the indubitable existence of individual selves by the Principle of Individuation, Hume finds that the concept of the self, while a natural belief, is not a belief with any logical support. He acknowledges that many imagine to be consciously aware of the self, of “of its perfect identity and simplicity” (Hume, 1), but that such belief is just that: imagination. For Hume, all assertions pertaining to the positive existence of the self run contrary to experience. Going by the perspective that ideas are derived from impressions, then it must be asked from what impression the idea of self may be derived; simply, to Hume, there is no singular, forceful impression from which an idea of self may be derived. His logic for this is that “if any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives…” (Hume, 1) just as our self is supposed to exist continuously for the duration of our lifespan. Considering that no such constant, invariable impression exists, there cannot be any derivation of the self. Instead, Hume argues in favor of a ‘bundle view’ of the self, stating that the “self” is but a bundle of perceptions, self identity only imagined to be a continuous whole because of humanity’s tendency to unify and associate these related perceptions and ideas. What empirical observation and experience proves for Hume is a refutation of Locke’s conception of what it should prove; rather than supporting the idea of self-identity being created from sensations, experience, and reflection, and humans having an awareness of that, we are instead only ever aware of impermanent sensations and feelings, never truly conscious of any ‘self.’ “...I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (Hume, 2). We are at every moment experiencing something new and different, a vast multitude of varying perceptions that are related but are not unified; there is no ‘self’ as in Locke’s sense of the word, but only a bundle of these sensations. As such, according to Hume, how can we even say that the self exists?
Empiricism formed a core part of both Locke and Hume’s philosophies, providing that knowledge comes from the senses and experience and not from reasoning or innate ideas. The direction that Locke took empiricism in as part of his arguments was to posit that the mind was a blank slate, tabula rasa, at birth, without ideas, yet still possessing the capacity to reason; sensory perception provides experience of the physical world to furnish minds with simple ideas, which are then combined into complex ideas within the mind. On the idea that the mind started out as a blank slate Hume was in agreement. He did not, however, agree that there was any innate capacity to reason; rather, all ideas must be derived from impressions, writing “It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea” (Hume, 1). To further clarify, “Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; said these ideas in their turn produce other impressions” (Hume, 6). Experience, for Hume, lead not to reasoning and the combining of ideas into complex ideas, but the production of additional impressions that would lead to more ideas. For both, experience and memory were important, Hume even agreeing that “memory alone... is to be considered… as the source of personal identity” (Hume, 7), sharing common ground with Locke’s Memory Theory of Identity, wherein he posits that “...let [a man] once find himself conscious of any of the cations of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor” (Locke, 9). When it comes to defining terms such as soul, man, personal identity, self, and the subjects pertaining to these terms, however, the divergence of Hume’s later ideas from Locke’s foundations becomes more apparent.
In order to properly examine everything pertaining to the soul, the self, and personal identity, there first must be clear definition of each of the terms. In his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke decides to make very clear distinctions between terms, separating the soul from the concept of man and providing that personal identity is dependent upon consciousness and memory. A man, for Locke, is a kind of living creature, and a person is a thinking thing; man is derived from a combination of soul and body. To elaborate on this, Locke writes, “But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce… be enough to make the same man” (Locke, 9). His example to illustrate the distinctions and roles of soul, body, and consciousness in making a man or a person is that of a prince transferring his soul and consciousness to the body of a cobbler, but when the soul is removed, he contends that “...every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to making the man… he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself” (Locke, 9). A soul is but a finite, thinking substance and a component of identity, not the sole determining factor. For Locke, the most important components of identity are the memories of a consciousness that typically accompany the soul, for even should the soul be removed, the consciousness left behind would carry on the person, but the man would not be the same. Therefore, contiguity of a consciousness is most important in providing for the existence of a person’s identity, and contiguity of soul and body provide for the existence of a man. The view that Hume takes up contrasts greatly with this, as he does not make the same separate distinction of soul and person that Locke does. Hume compares the soul or person interchangeably, it seems, to “a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts” (Hume, 7). Hume does this to illustrate that the person’s identity (or soul) is a conception brought about as an association of ideas and perceptions, emphasizing the critical role of memory in providing resemblance of past perceptions. “We may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect…” (Hume, 6) writes Hume, emphasizing not just resemblance of perceptions in our memories, but the phenomena of causation in defining identity. With our memories, humans furnish themselves with resemblance of past perceptions that lead to new impressions and therefore new ideas, and much like a republic or commonwealth, the changes brought about over time vary character, disposition, and ideas, but do not completely alter identity. “Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity…” (Hume, 7). While memory is critical to both Locke and Hume’s conceptions of identity, Locke chooses to make distinctions between various terms and emphasize the value of those various components in defining identity, and Hume instead deems the matter of identity to be primarily a “grammatical” question best answered by providing for the soul to be the same as personal identity, defined by memories allowing the causation of new impressions. Hume finds that the self is solely perceptions, but without a single impression to provide an idea of self, we cannot even conclusively say there is a self at all. This contrasts mightily with Locke, completely refuting even the concept of self should it hold true. Not only do Hume’s definition of what the self would be and how personal identity would be determined differ from Locke’s definitions, but he even goes so far as to question the very existence of the self.
Taking into consideration the arguments offered by the respective philosophers, I remain most in agreement with the views offered by John Locke. I have great respect for Hume and adoration of his ideas, and I agree with many of his points on human tendencies, but Locke’s definitions and arguments about the self are, in my estimation, more in line with what I have observed of life. As we think, are we not aware of our own thought processes, the fact that we are one being in the act of thinking? To be aware of our consciousness, to be able to identify our individual selves so distinctly, to be able to distinguish between “want food” and “I want food,” and to be able to make moral decisions that could harm ourselves for the benefit of others are all abilities I consider to stand in proof of the existence of the self. For me, Hume’s failure to distinguish persons from human beings as consequence of his choice to be skeptical of the self and to define the soul and identity so vaguely and so differently from Locke produce a lack of moral accountability and a lack of capacity to make moral decisions. Were we to consider Hume as being wholly correct, that the self may not even exist, being just a term for a whirlwind of perceptions, and that new ideas only come from the impressions of our memories, and not from innate capacity to reason, then how are we to hold individuals morally accountable, and how are we to make moral decisions that benefit others yet provide solely detriment to ourselves? Without the person being distinct from the man, we would be unable to defend suspected criminals on grounds of drunkenness or on grounds of insanity. If the person, the consciousness, is not distinct from the man (the body and the soul), then even an individual who commits a crime while under the influence of some psychiatric disease would receive full punishment instead of a lesser sentence. Granted, Locke does acknowledge that as this applies to drunken individuals, our laws punish the drunk and sober equally, in spite of conscious awareness, “because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea” (Locke, 12). Despite that, I still feel as though Hume’s lack of distinction in this area raises moral concerns. In addition to those misgivings, if Hume is correct, then must we attribute all of our moral decisions to a bundle of perceptions and associations of ideas derived solely from the impressions of the senses? I would rather hold that reasoning, and the ability to form complex ideas based off of prior experience and our own capacity to think would provide us the ability to commit to actions that benefit others and not just ourselves. The concerns of morality that Hume’s philosophy of the self raises, even with his definition of his own moral beliefs later on, means that I cannot accept his arguments on identity and find, instead, Locke’s arguments to be more compelling. There must be a distinction between person and man, for the consciousness is in many cases, as our legal infrastructure and cases of mental health prove, not accountable to the same degree in all instances. Further, were we to be able to transfer our consciousness and our memories, just as we can transfer a hard drive from one computer to another, there must be a self that transfers and can identify itself concretely as the same consciousness. After all, transferring a hard drive between computers, when accounting for hardware compatibility and driver issues, provides a final computer that, for the most part, behaves exactly the same as before, save for some additional abilities, perhaps. Why should humans be any different, then? If Hume were considered correct, such a transfer could not happen in the same way, for the self may not even exist. Additionally, transferring a bundle of sensations as memories would, I think, cause there to be some consciousness capable of utilizing those memories to identify itself, establishing itself as extant. And further in support of this, and the necessity of acknowledging the existence of a consciousness and therefore a self, consider Locke’s example of two conscious beings sharing the same body, much as a multiple personality disorder person may. “Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies: I ask, in the first case, whether the day and the night- man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato” (Locke, 12)? I would say that yes, these are distinct persons, and such a distinction of person from soul and man is therefore necessary in the first place. Much as having two operating systems on one hard drive denotes the existence of two essentially distinct ‘computers’ and operating environments, two consciousnesses inhabiting the same body would constitute two persons. As such, in contrast to what Hume would posit, we must, for practicality’s sake at the least, induce ourselves to acknowledge conscious self as extant and person, as derived from it, a distinct entity from man. If only for reasons of practicality, for our legal systems and our own sanity and satisfaction I must concur with Locke instead of Hume. Hume’s positions, simply, are unsatisfactory for purposes of determining our morality, our legal systems, or in explaining much of the phenomena we witness. Hume would say that the assertions of philosophers like Locke are “contrary to experience” (Hume, 1), yet even if we are not intimately conscious of the self at every moment, my experience, and the experience of many, would seem to dictate that the self must exist and must be defined concretely, as Locke defines it. It is far more useful, and far more in line with the experience afforded by the aforementioned examples offered, to consider the self as real and the person distinct from the man, and therefore I am compelled to refute Hume’s perspective and agree with Locke.
David Hume and John Locke are considered to have been, perhaps, the greatest empiricist philosophers, not only of their time, but of all time. Both agreed on the vitality of experience for human identity, and both placed high value on memory determining out identity, but Hume later diverged from Locke’s foundations and established very different perspectives as a result of his skepticism. Locke provided distinct definitions of various terms and ascribed chief importance to a consciousness as separate from the soul and body in determining a personal identity, which, in tandem with the man formed of soul and body, provides the self. Hume instead questioned the very existence of the self and deemed it to be a grammatical term describing the bundle of perceptions we experience at all times, associated ideas falsely unified, while still determining memory to be critical for identity. Rather than a continuous self derived from our memories, our person, and the contiguity of our body, Hume emphasized resemblance and causation of impressions in providing personal identity, and emphasized belief’s role in the self. Hume took empiricism in a different direction and held that ideas came into being somewhat differently from Locke, preferring impressions and associations of ideas to sensory perception leading to simple and then to complex ideas. The two differed in their classifications and definitions of many terms, and that, in turn, produced wildly different perspectives on just what, exactly, the self and personal identity were. I am of the opinion that Locke was more correct in his views, but how we define and distinguish the self, the consciousness, the person, the soul, and the man remain contentious matters of debate.
Hume, David. “OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, From Book I, Part IV, Section VI in ‘A Treatise of Human Nature (1793).’” PHIL 2010: Introduction to Philosophy, Project Gutenberg/ECore, 1793, https://go.view.usg.edu/content/enforced/1820580-CO.540.PHIL2010.81367.20202/Course Content 2018/Readings/02 Hume-Of Personal Identity.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=wCrjqEPp4cBosbtCrpPRjvmhM&ou=1820580.
Locke, John. “CHAPTER XXVII OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, From An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.” PHIL 2010: Introduction to Philosophy, Project Gutenberg/ECore, 1690, https://go.view.usg.edu/content/enforced/1820580-CO.540.PHIL2010.81367.20202/Course Content 2018/Readings/02 Locke-Of Identity and Diversity.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=wCrjqEPp4cBosbtCrpPRjvmhM&ou=1820580.
Nimbalkar, Namita. “John Locke on Personal Identity.” US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health, Medknow Publications, Jan. 2011, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3115296/.